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Abstract: 
McMahan argues that justification defeats liability to defensive attack (which would have 
far-reaching consequences for the ethics of war, in particular for the thesis of the moral 
equality of combatants). In response, I argue, first, that McMahan’s attempt to burden the 
contrary claim with counter-intuitive implications fails; second, that McMahan’s own 
position implies that the innocent civilians do not have a right of self-defense against 
justified attackers, which neither coheres with his description of the case (the justified 
bombers infringe the rights of the civilians) nor with his views about rights forfeiture, is 
unsupported by independent argument, and, in any case, extremely implausible and 
counter-intuitive; and third, that his interpretation of the insulin case confuses the 
normative relations between an agent’s justification and non-liability (or lack thereof) on 
the one hand and permissible or impermissible interference with the agent’s act on the 
other. Similar confusions, fourth, affect his discussion of liability to compensation. 
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1. Introduction 
Jeff McMahan claims that there is a moral inequality of combatants, in the sense that the 
combatants on the unjustified side in a war are liable to attack while the combatants on 
the justified side in a war are not.1 There are different definitions of liability, but they all 
                                                
∗ This is the preprint version of an article in Ethical Theory and Moral Practice (Online 
First, 2016, http://link.springer.com/article/10.1007%2Fs10677-016-9712-y). The final 
publication is available at Springer via http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s10677-016-9712-y. 
1 McMahan is not the first author to assume a moral inequality of combatants. In fact – 
and against a widespread but mistaken opinion – this was the standard view in just war 
theory from Aquinas via Vitoria and Suárez (and many others) to Grotius, Anscombe, 
Coady, and Biggar. For brief historical overviews of this idea, see Uwe Steinhoff, 
“Rights, Liability, and the Moral Equality of Combatants,” Journal of Ethics 13 (2012), 
pp. 339-366, section 2; Cheyney Ryan, “Democratic Duty and the Moral Dilemmas of 
Soldiers,” Ethics 122 (2011), pp. 10-42, at 13-18; Gregory M. Reichberg, “The Moral 
Equality of Combatants – A Doctrine in Classical Just war Theory? A Response to 
Graham Parsons,” Journal of Military Ethics 12(2) (2013), pp. 181-194; Nigel Biggar, In 
Defence of War (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2013), esp. pp. 191-196. An 
anonymous reviewer states, however, that the standard modern view, which is “fully 
embodied in the laws of war, is the moral equality of soldiers”; and this, allegedly, makes 
McMahan a “radical revisionist of current doctrine.” In my view, the reviewer equates 
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imply that someone who is liable to attack has no right not to be attacked, and thus would 
not be wronged by an attack. However, this moral inequality claim has been challenged: 
since many combatants on the justified side infringe the rights of innocent bystanders, for 
example by “collaterally” killing them, they would, on certain accounts of liability to 
attack, become liable to attack themselves.2 
Jeff McMahan rejects such accounts of liability: he claims that “justification exempts 
one from liability to defensive attack.”3 In the following I will argue that he is mistaken, 
referring to his most recent and sustained defense of his claim. 
McMahan pursues two strategies in arguing against the view that justified attackers (or 
“threateners,” as he calls them) are liable to attack. His first strategy seeks to show that 
such a view has counter-intuitive implications. Thus, this is basically a reductio ad 
absurdum strategy. His second strategy, in contrast, is to try to undermine his opponents’ 
positive arguments for their view to give positive support for his own view. 
Before considering his arguments, we have to set the scene by describing his main 
example, the Tactical Bombers. McMahan’s own description of this case is very long and 
detailed, but for the purposes of the present discussion not all of these details are 
relevant.4 We can summarize his example as follows: 
There is a bomber crew of 5 people who have, in the context of a humanitarian 
intervention, the mission to bomb and destroy a military target. If they are 
successful, 100 innocent civilians in the state in which the intervention takes place 
will be saved, and there are no alternative means of saving them. However, 5 
                                                                                                                                            
“the standard modern view” with the Walzerian view. However, in light of an unbroken 
Catholic tradition from Aquinas to Anscombe, Coady, and Biggar, there is no reason to 
take Walzer as “the standard.” Moreover, the laws of armed conflict do not say anything 
about moral equality. What is actually embodied in the laws of war is the view that 
soldiers should have a legal right to participate in unjustified wars and should therefore 
not be legally punished for such participation. This, however, is a view taken by 
McMahan himself, see “The Morality of War and the Law of War,” in David Rodin and 
Henry Shue (eds.), Just and Unjust Warriors: The Moral and Legal Status of Soldiers 
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008), pp. 19-43, and it is a view taken 400 years 
before McMahan by Grotius. Thus, there is no “radical revision.” Again, see on this 
Steinhoff, “Rights, Liability, and the Moral Equality of Combatants,” section 2. 
2 Uwe Steinhoff, On the Ethics of War and Terrorism (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
2007), pp. 95-97; “Rights, Liability, and the Moral Equality of Combatants”, The Journal 
of Ethics 13 (2012), pp. 339-366. 
3 Jeff McMahan, “Self-Defense Against Justified Threateners,” in Helen Frowe and 
Gerald Lang (eds.), How We Fight (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2014), pp. 104-137, 
at p. 118. 
4 In fact, if all these details were relevant, McMahan’s example would have little 
applicability to actual wars: there are no real instances of bombing military targets that 
have all the features of McMahan’s case. (For instance, in McMahan’s example the 
villagers who get killed are citizens of a neutral country, living near the border, and they 
do not get killed by the bombs themselves, but by the debris that is hurled over the 
border, and they have no close personal relations to each other.) 
3 
innocent villagers will be killed in this attack as a side-effect.5 
McMahan assumes that this attack will be proportionate and justified. Thus, the 
tactical bombers are justified attackers. We will grant this assumption here. 
Let us now turn to McMahan’s first strategy. McMahan’s prime target is the view that 
“the criterion of liability to defensive attack is moral responsibility for a threat of 
wrongful [he means unjust, that is, rights-violating or rights-infringing6] harm to 
another.”7 He calls this view “the responsibility account.” However, as he himself 
subscribes to a responsibility account, although one that is qualified by the doctrine that 
“justification exempts one from liability to defensive action,”8 it is useful to distinguish 
between an unqualified responsibility account and a qualified one. 
For McMahan, the problem of the unqualified responsibility account lies precisely in 
its rejection of the doctrine in question (“justification defeats liability to defensive 
attack”), for this rejection allegedly has certain “implausible implications,” namely “that 
the tactical bombers are liable to be killed in defense of the villagers, that neutral third 
parties therefore have a liability justification for killing them, and that the bombers have 
no right of self-defense either against the villagers or against third parties (though they 
might have a different justification for defensive action derived from the importance of 
achieving their mission).”9 
From McMahan’s discussion and his references to my work it would appear that he 
thinks that I endorse the unqualified responsibility account.10 However, I actually reject 
both the unqualified and the qualified responsibility accounts, because both of them lead 
to counter-intuitive, namely rather draconian, implications about who is liable to attack.11 
I do, however, indeed subscribe to an account that implies that justified attackers are 
liable to attack. Yet, to simply assume that this is an “implausible” implication would 
obviously be question-begging in the context of McMahan’s attempt to defend his 
doctrine that “justification defeats liability to defensive attack”. McMahan would have to 
show that it is an implausible implication. 
And indeed, he does try to show this. His argument is that the first implication (the 
bombers are liable) of the unqualified responsibility account implies the other two 
implications (“neutral third parties therefore [my emphasis] have a liability justification 
for killing them, and … the bombers have no right of self-defense either against the 
villagers or against third parties”). 
 
2. Who has a Right to Self-Defense – the Justified Bombers or the Innocent Civilians? 
Let us start with the last implication, namely that “the bombers have no right of self-
defense either against the villagers or against third parties.” McMahan states: 
                                                
5 For the complete example, see McMahan, “Self-Defense Against Justified Threateners,” 
pp. 104-105. 
6 See ibid., p. 114. 
7 Ibid. 
8 Ibid., p. 118. 
9 Ibid. 
10 Ibid., p. 115, n. 6. 
11 See Steinhoff, “Rights, Liability, and the Moral Equality of Combatants,” section 4.2. 
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Many people, of course, will not find it counterintuitive to suppose that the 
villagers are permitted to shoot down the bombers in self-defense. But what is 
counterintuitive is the claim that, while the five villagers are permitted to kill the 
five bombers in self-defense, the bombers are not permitted to kill the villagers in 
self-defense. For that to be true, it seems that there must be some significant moral 
asymmetry between the villagers and the bombers. Yet on the assumptions most 
favorable to the villagers, both groups act with moral justification in threatening to 
harm the other. The only difference is that the bombers have attacked first. But that 
is of course precisely what they were morally justified in doing.12 
In reply, first, a morally significant difference between the bombers and the villagers 
is not only that the bombers attack first, but that the bombers, by attacking first, are 
infringing the rights of the villagers. The villagers, in contrast, are not infringing 
anybody’s rights by living in the village. Thus, the villagers defend themselves only after 
their rights have been threatened, while the bombers bomb the villagers without the 
villagers having threatened their lives (or anybody else’s, for that matter). This moral 
asymmetry is entirely unaffected by the fact of the bombers’ justification. 
Second, the claim that the bombers are liable to attack does not have the counter-
intuitive implication that the bombers cannot justifiably defend themselves against the 
villagers. As McMahan himself acknowledges, the bombers can – and will under the 
circumstances – have a necessity justification for defending themselves, that is, they have 
a justification based on the importance of their mission.13 
One might perhaps be tempted to argue that the fact that the bombers have a necessity 
justification to bomb the military target and to thereby foreseeably kill the villagers does 
not imply that they then also have a necessity justification for defending themselves 
against the villagers, that is, for killing them intentionally.14 After all, many philosophers 
claim that there is an important difference between killing a person foreseeably and 
killing a person intentionally. Yet, as many other authors have pointed out,15 this is very 
hard to believe. To wit, a person with a hammer who intentionally smashes a fly on an 
innocent person’s forehead (someone offered him money for killing the fly), foreseeing 
that the person’s skull will then be crushed too, and a person who intentionally crushes an 
innocent person’s skull (someone offered him money for doing so), foreseeing that the fly 
on the forehead will then be crushed too, are, in all Western jurisdictions, simply 
murderers. Law does not look more favorably on the first skull-crusher than on the 
second. Nor should it: the idea that there is a morally significant difference between the 
two cases seems to be entirely counter-intuitive. Things do not change if we assume that 
                                                
12 McMahan, “Self-Defense Against Justified Threateners,” p. 114.  
13 Ibid., pp. 113 and 118. 
14 So argues an anonymous reviewer. 
15 For a recent devastating criticism of the moral significance of this distinction, see 
Howard Nye, “On the Equivalence of Trolleys and Transplants: The Lack of Intrinsic 
Difference between ‘Collateral Damage’ and Intended Harm,” Utilitas (FirstView, 2014), 
doi: 10.1017/S0953820814000181. For my own critique and further references, see Uwe 
Steinhoff, On the Ethics of War and Terrorism (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007), 
pp. 33-52. 
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there was actually a justification for wielding the hammer. Suppose, for instance, that the 
fly is the carrier of the doomsday virus which would exterminate humanity, and we are 
faced with the last chance (there are no other means than the ones described here) to keep 
it from escaping the lab. In the first scenario the person’s skull is crushed as a side-effect, 
since the fly is sitting on it, in the second scenario, the innocent person’s skull is crushed 
because the fly is sitting behind it and one wants to give the anti-fly sniper a clear shot. 
The innocent person in the second case will certainly not think that his situation has 
dramatically improved if he swaps places with the innocent person in the first case, and it 
is unclear why there should be something morally more dubious about the first kind of 
attack than about the second one. If there was a difference, this would mean that there has 
to be a number x of people prevented from dying through the virus that would make 
smashing the skull justifiable in the first scenario while in the second it would remain 
unjustifiable. Again, this seems to be extremely hard to believe. 
Moreover, and even more importantly, we are currently discussing McMahan’s 
attempt to burden the account defended here with “implausible implications.” However, 
one can only derive implications from an account on the grounds of its own assumptions, 
not on the grounds of assumptions the account rejects. Thus, while it is true that 
McMahan assumes that there is a morally significant difference between intentional and 
foreseen killing, I, for one, emphatically reject this assumption. Accordingly, the account 
defended here most certainly does not have the implausible implication that the tactical 
bombers may not defend themselves against the civilians. They may defend themselves 
on the basis of a necessity justification. 
Yet, this is, according to McMahan, “not what is generally meant by a right of self-
defense,” and he states that some people (including him, apparently) may be “troubled by 
the idea that the bombers lack a right of self-defense.”16 He then considers the attempt to 
escape this allegedly troubling idea by claiming that the bombers’ liability (the forfeiture 
of their right to life) “does not entail the loss of their right of defense as well” and affirms 
that this claim would be “doubtfully coherent.”17 I do not want to take a stance on 
whether the claim in question (a claim I nowhere make) is coherent or not; rather, I would 
like to shed some doubts on the coherence of McMahan’s own claims. 
To wit, McMahan insists that the bombers do have a right of self-defense against the 
villagers. But how is that possible within the framework of his theory? After all, he 
emphasizes that on his account of liability people can only become liable to attack by 
forfeiting rights through their own responsible action.18 Moreover, he explicitly defines 
“justified threateners” as “people who act with moral justification but whose justified 
action will wrong or infringe the rights of others – in this case, the villagers’ right not to 
be killed.” Why? Because “the villagers’ right against attack has been neither waived nor 
forfeited, it is overridden.”19 In other words, the villagers have done nothing to forfeit 
                                                
16 McMahan, “Self-Defense Against Justified Threateners,” p. 117. 
17 Ibid. 
18 Jeff McMahan, Killing in War (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009), pp. 7-37; 
“Individual Liability in War: A Response to Fabre, Leveringhaus and Tadros,” Utilitas 
24(2) (2012), pp. 279-299, at 296.  
19 McMahan, “Self-Defense Against Justified Threateners,” p. 105. 
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their right to life. 
Yet, McMahan overlooks the fact that the villagers have also done nothing to forfeit 
their right of self-defense. But if the villagers have a right of self-defense against the 
bombers, then it is conceptually and logically impossible that the bombers have a right of 
self-defense against the villagers. 
This is at least the case if we are talking about so-called claim-rights. As McMahan 
notes, “a claim right is … a right against intervention.”20 The bomber’s shooting the 
villagers when the villagers try to defend themselves with their anti-aircraft gun 
obviously is a way of interfering with the villagers’ self-defense. Thus, it is simply 
impossible that the bombers have a claim right to defend themselves against the villagers 
if the villagers have a claim right to defend themselves against the bombers. But while 
McMahan deems it “doubtfully coherent” that the bombers lose their right to life but 
retain their right to self-defense, he apparently and interestingly does not deem it 
“doubtfully coherent” to imply that, conversely, the villagers retain their right to life but 
lose their right to defend their lives.  
Perhaps one might be tempted to speculate that the villagers forfeit their claim right to 
defend themselves by defending themselves. However, that is as absurd as claiming that 
someone forfeits his right to life by living. Another possibility would be to deny that 
people have a claim-right to self-defense. Maybe they only have a liberty-right: a liberty-
right of self-defense would merely imply that I do not wrong the aggressor if I defend 
myself, but it would not imply that the aggressor wrongs me by defending himself against 
my defense. Yet, first, this possibility does not sit well with McMahan’s insistence that 
aggressors have no right of self-defense against defenders.21 Second, if people only have 
a liberty right of self-defense, then this would also be true of the bombers. But if it is, as 
McMahan claims, “doubtfully coherent” to claim that someone loses his right to life 
(which in McMahan’s account is certainly a claim-right) but keeps his right to self-
defense, then it would also appear to be doubtfully coherent to claim that the bombers 
retain their right to life but would nevertheless not be wronged by villagers who try to kill 
them in order to defensively preempt the bomber’s self-defense against the villagers. 
Third, if the villagers indeed had no claim-right to defend themselves against the justified 
bombers, then the justification of the latter would in effect not only defeat their own 
liability but also the villagers’ claim-right to self-defense. But why does it then not also 
defeat the villagers’ right to life? Again one would like to have an argument for this 
curious asymmetry between the right to life and the right to self-defense, but McMahan 
offers none.22 Fourth, that people have a basic claim right to self-defense (and not just a 
                                                
20 McMahan, Killing in War, p. 62. McMahan is not entirely correct. My claim right to do 
x myself is a right against interference, but my claim right that someone else do x is not a 
right against interference, but, obviously, a right that that person does x. This distinction 
need not concern us for present purposes. 
21 Ibid., p. 14. 
22 One might suggest that if the villagers had no right to life in the first place, the 
proportionality considerations of the necessity justification would have taken a 
completely different turn, justifying much more collateral damage than is justified under 
the therefore necessary assumption that the villagers do have a right to life. However, it is 
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liberty-right) is an extremely plausible assumption. Without it, it would, for instance, be 
impossible to explain why the state would wrong us (as we certainly intuitively and quite 
rightly think it would) if it prohibited us from defending ourselves.23 
Another possibility one might speculate about is to apply so-called rights specification 
theory to the right of self-defense and claim that this right includes a right to defend 
oneself against culpable attackers, but not a right to defend oneself against justified 
attackers. Yet, this would be obviously entirely ad hoc and question-begging. It would 
also again raise the question of why the same cannot be said about the right to life: an 
innocent person’s right to life might not include the right not to be killed in a necessary 
and proportionate military attack. A further question is why one should not specify the 
right to life in such a way that it does not include a right not to be attacked by the 
innocent victims of one’s justified but rights-infringing acts. In this case, “justification 
defeats liability” would not help the justified bombers – McMahan’s account of liability 
involves, as already noted, forfeiture through responsible action, but a right one does not 
have in the first place cannot be forfeited, which means that the “justification defeats 
liability” protection against forfeiture would be useless for the bombers. They would not 
be “liable” to attack, but they would simply have no right not to be attacked. Either way, 
stipulatively “specifying” rights such that they conform to one’s philosophical 
predilections does not amount to an argument. While a certain rights specification could 
be a legitimate result of an argument about the respective rights of the villagers and the 
bombers, one cannot simply assume it. 
Another suggestion I have come across is that McMahan could claim that the 
villager’s right not to be killed supports a claim right to do some things in self-defense, 
but not a claim-right to kill in self-defense.24 Thus, if the civilians tried to kill the 
bombers, they would engage in excessive self-defense, and hence the bombers could 
                                                                                                                                            
simply not true that this assumption is necessary to get the “right” results as far as 
proportionality is concerned. The innocence of the villagers is quite capable of according 
their interests in life a sufficient weight; but if it turns out that killing 5 innocent 
bystanders is proportionate, then, one could argue, they lose (if not “forfeit” in 
McMahan’s sense) their right to life. McMahan, however, does not argue that. My 
question is why: what principled reason is there for stripping the civilians of their right to 
self-defense but not of their right to life? This different treatment of the two rights seems 
to be simply arbitrary. 
23 See Sanford Kadish, “Respect for Life and Regard for Rights in the Criminal Law,” 
California Law Review 64(4) (1976), pp. 871-901, at 884. 
24 This suggestion has been made by an anonymous reviewer. Note that I myself nowhere 
base the right to self-defense on a right to life. After all, one may defend not only one’s 
life, but also lesser things, like bodily integrity, property, or even honor. For my argument 
in this paper, however, it is irrelevant whether an innocent person’s right to lethal self-
defense against attempts at his life are based on a right to life or whether it is part and 
parcel of a fundamental, underived right to engage in necessary and proportionate self-
defense against unjust attacks. Personally, I subscribe to the latter view. See Uwe 
Steinhoff, “Self-Defense as Claim Right, Liberty, and Act-Specific Agent-Relative 
Prerogative,” Law and Law and Philosophy 35(2) (2016), pp. 193-209. 
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defend themselves against this by killing the civilians. There are two problems with this 
suggestion. The first is that it seems objectionably ad hoc and arbitrary. To wit, if 
bombers who justifiably initiate an attack on entirely non-liable people are not liable to 
be killed (although they are liable to some force, according to the suggestion), why then 
should civilians be liable to be killed although they certainly have at least a partial excuse 
to defend themselves against others and although, moreover, these others are not entirely 
non-liable and, furthermore, initiated a lethal attack against them? Of course, one can 
simply claim that there is such a curious asymmetry here – but then this is, indeed, just a 
mere claim. The second problem is that this suggestion simply contradicts what 
McMahan says. He nowhere states that justification merely diminishes liability; rather, he 
says that justification defeats “liability to defensive harm,”25 that it “exempts one from 
liability to defensive attack,” or that it “excludes” one from it.26 In other words, on his 
account the bombers are not liable at all. But this, as already argued, makes McMahan’s 
position incoherent since it surreptitiously and inconsistently strips the civilians of a right 
that, by McMahan’s own lights, they have done nothing to forfeit.  
Finally, it is indeed intuitive to suppose that the villagers are permitted to shoot down 
the bombers. As McMahan himself admits, he is “sympathetic to this intuition and once 
sought to defend it.”27 Yet, if we grant (McMahan – counter-intuitively – does not grant 
this anymore) that the villagers may shoot down the bombers, then the question arises 
how that can be explained without supposing that the bombers are liable to attack. If we 
suppose that the bombers are not liable and retain their right to life, then the only possible 
explanation is that the villagers are permitted to override the rights of the bombers, 
probably on the basis of an agent-relative permission to give their own interests greater 
weight than the interests of the bombers. However, McMahan – rightly, in my view28 – 
rejects this idea as implausible.29 But if this idea is implausible, then the liability-based 
explanation – being the only one remaining – is plausible by default, as it were – unless 
McMahan had independent arguments to reject either the idea that the villagers are 
permitted to shoot down the bombers or independent arguments to support the idea that 
justification indeed does defeat liability. Yet, McMahan does not have independent 
arguments against the first idea, and his arguments for the second idea are unconvincing, 
as I will argue in a moment in sections 4 and 5. 
Moreover, McMahan’s new position, namely that the villagers are not justified in 
defending themselves or permitted to defend themselves,30 implies, in conjunction with 
                                                
25 Jeff McMahan, “Justification and Liability in War,” Journal of Political Philosophy 16 
(2008), pp. 227-244, at 231. 
26 Jeff McMahan, “Self-Defense Against Justified Threateners,” in Helen Frowe and 
Gerald Lang (eds.), How We Fight (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2014), pp. 104-137, 
at pp. 118 and 119. 
27 McMahan, “Self-Defense Against Justified Threateners,” p. 108. 
28 Uwe Steinhoff, “Justifying Defense Against Non-Responsible Threats and Justified 
Aggressors: the Liability vs. the Rights-Infringement Account,” Philosophia (Online 
First, 2015), DOI 10.1007/s11406-015-9666-7. 
29 McMahan, “Self-Defense Against Justified Threateners,” section 7.5. 
30 Ibid., pp. 108 and 136. 
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his claim that “the criterion of liability to attack in war is moral responsibility for an 
objectively unjustified threat of harm,”31 that the villagers become liable to attack if they 
defend themselves. In fact, since the threat they pose is lethal, they would become liable 
to be killed (if otherwise the threat cannot be averted); and according to McMahan, it is 
permissible to kill any number of people who are liable to be killed.32 All this taken 
together leads to certain unpalatable conclusions, however. 
Consider this variation of McMahan’s tactical bombers. The general wants to bomb an 
ammunitions factory. He knows that thereby he will save 100 innocent lives, and kill 5 
innocent bystanders. Yet, he finds out that 500 other villagers, when they see the bombers 
approaching, will try to defend the 5. Each of the 500 has an anti-aircraft gun, and it 
would be necessary to kill each of them to reach the target. (Thus, it is not the case that 
the number of the villagers decreases each villager’s contribution to the lethal threat that 
the bombers face: each of the villagers is a lethal threat in his or her own right.) On 
McMahan’s account, all these 500 (but not the 5) villagers would be liable to attack and 
could be killed in the course of achieving the mission. Maybe I am being squeamish and 
overestimate the worth of human life, but to me this seems to be a morally entirely 
unacceptable consequence of his account.  
But, one might object, do the villagers, by taking part in the hostilities, not become 
combatants themselves, and thereby legitimate targets under international law? If one 
takes into account a feature of McMahan’s original example that I have only mentioned 
in a footnote, namely that the villagers are citizens of a neutral country (their village is 
across the border in that country), this would be wrong, since the threat they are facing is 
not lawful,33 and self-defense against unlawful attack does not qualify as taking part in 
the hostilities.34 If we are talking about villagers in the country where the actual war is 
taking place, however, the legal situation might well be different. Yet, we are concerned 
with the moral question. And while the 500 villagers might in one sense take part in the 
hostilities, it should be noted that there is a difference between strict self- or other-
defense against an ongoing or imminent attack on the one hand and on the other actively, 
                                                
31 McMahan, Killing in War, p. 35. 
32 Jeff McMahan, “What Rights May Be Defended by Means of War?” in Cécile Fabre 
and Seth Lazar (eds.), The Morality of Defensive War (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
2014), pp. 115-156, at 137.  
33 An anonymous reviewer remarks that if the bombing is lawful then the harm to the 
bystanders must be lawful too. However, I precisely deny that the bombing would be 
lawful under the circumstances. (According to Article 1 of the Hague Convention 
Respecting the Rights and Duties of Neutral Powers and Persons in Case of War on Land, 
“[t]he territory of neutral Powers is inviolable,” and killing neutrals located in their own 
territory would certainly amount to a violation of said territory.) This does not contradict 
the assumptions of McMahan’s example, though. After all, he talks about moral 
justification, not legal justification.  
34 Michael N. Schmitt, “The Interpretive Guidance on the Notion of Direct Participation 
in Hostilities: A Critical Analysis,” Harvard National Security Journal 1 (2010), pp. 5-
44, at 34. 
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and again and again, seeking out the enemy to kill him (search and destroy).35 The 
villagers engage in the former, not in the latter. It seems, therefore (at least to me), that 
the implication of McMahan’s account that all 500 villagers would become liable to 
attack and that hence the bombers’ mission would remain proportionate, although they 
will now kill five times more people than they save – people, moreover, who did not 
initially pose a threat but only reacted to an unjust threat posed to their fellow villagers by 
the bombers – is not an implication that speaks in favor of McMahan’s theory. 
Thus, our discussion so far has shown that the implication of the unqualified 
responsibility account (and of other accounts that hold justified attackers liable to attack) 
that the tactical bombers of McMahan’s example have no right to self-defense is not 
implausible at all. Rather, it is McMahan’s contrary claim that is implausible. In fact, it 
seems to contradict some of McMahan’s very own basic premises about rights-forfeiture 
and about what justified bombers actually do: attack people who haven’t forfeited their 
rights. 
 
3. Do Neutral Third Parties Have a “Liability-Justification” to Kill the Justified 
Bombers? 
Let us now turn to the implication that “neutral third parties have a liability-justification” 
for killing the tactical bombers.36 Is this really implausible? That is not so clear, but be 
that as it may: as far as I am concerned, I happen to reject the idea that liability alone can 
justify anything.37 On my definition of liability a person is liable to be killed if she has no 
right not to be killed. However, how can a person’s mere lack of a right not to be killed 
provide by itself a justification to kill her? I do not think that a 500-year-old oak tree 
holds a right against me not to be cut down, but I fail to see how that could possibly 
justify me in cutting it down.38 That same logic applies to persons.39 
                                                
35 See on this distinction David Carroll Cochran, “War-Pacifism,” Social Theory and 
Practice 22 (1996), pp. 161-180. 
36 McMahan, “Self-Defense Against Justified Threateners,” p. 118, see also pp. 114-117. 
37 See Uwe Steinhoff, “Self-Defense as Claim Right, Liberty, and Act-Specific Agent-
Relative Prerogative,” Law and Philosophy (Online First, 2015), DOI 10.1007/s10982-
015-9251-z. 
38 Compare also Suzanne Uniacke, Permissible Killing: The Self-Defence Justification of 
Homicide (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996), p. 191. 
39 On McMahan’s account – but not definition – of liability people can only be liable to 
defensive harm if there is, so to say, a reason to harm them. In particular, on his account a 
person cannot be liable to defensive harm if harming that person would do no good (for 
example save the defender). I reject such an account of liability, and so do others. See 
Joanna Mary Firth and Jonathan Quong, “Necessity, Moral Liability, and Defensive 
Harm,” Law and Philosophy 31(6) (2012), pp. 673-701; Helen Frowe, “Self-Defence and 
the Principle of Non-Combatant Immunity,” Journal of Moral Philosophy 8 (2011), pp. 
530-546, at 545, n. 31; Uwe Steinhoff, “The Nature and Scope of Self-Defense under 
Special Consideration of Killing in War,” Filozofski Godišnjak (Philosophical Yearbook) 
25 (2012), pp. 207-234, at 220-224, and “Shortcomings of and Alternatives to the Rights-
Forfeiture Theory of Justified Self-Defense and Punishment,” ms. available at 
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Thus, contrary to McMahan’s explicit attribution of this claim to me, I have most 
certainly not claimed that “there is an agent-neutral liability justification for killing the 
bombers.”40 First, I have not made the claim that the justified bombers become liable to 
attack by just anyone: I made one exception.41 This need not concern us here, though. 
More important is that I have explicitly distinguished between liability on the one hand 
and justification or even permissibility on the other,42 which means that agent-neutral 
liability does not imply agent-neutral justification. For the “unjust combatants” to be 
justified in shooting down the justified bombers it is simply not sufficient that the latter 
are liable to attack; rather, the fact, for instance, that the unjust combatants are defending 
people they have special relations to, like family members, friends, or their compatriots 
more generally, can provide them (sometimes) with a justification.43 As McMahan once 
admitted himself: “If the civilians have a right of self-defense, it’s hard to believe that 
those they’ve paid to protect them aren’t permitted to help them do what they’re 
permitted to do.”44 On the other hand, completely neutral third parties simply do not have 
such a justification. Thus, I submit that the account I endorse does not produce counter-
intuitive results, but in fact precisely the intuitive ones.45 Likewise, while, in my view, the 
unqualified responsibility account does in fact have certain counter-intuitive implications 
                                                                                                                                            
http://philpapers.org/rec/STESOA-5.  
40 McMahan, “Self-Defense Against Justified Threateners,” p. 115. 
41 Steinhoff, “Rights, Liability, and the Moral Equality of Combatants,” pp. 357-358. 
42 Ibid., Sect. 5. 
43 Note that by accepting the existence of agent-relative justifications I am in no way 
contradicting my rejection, in the previous section, of the idea that one’s self-preference 
is sufficient to override the rights of innocent, non-liable people. After all, on my account 
the bombers are liable. 
44 Jeff McMahan, “Self-Defense against Justified Threats,” (Lecture notes, Sheffield, 
August 2010), unpublished ms., on file with author, p. 6. 
45 This also takes care of an objection of Stephen Shalom’s (personal communication). 
He imagines a D-Day* which differs from the actual D-Day in that in this war the Allies 
are not also intent on safeguarding their own imperialist interests and do not engage in 
indiscriminate bombing of civilians, etc., thus the war is clearly justified. He claims, 
however, that by my argument it would be “perfectly justified for a French civilian to 
shoot down an Allied plane, thereby making it more likely that the invasion (and the just 
war for a just cause) will fail. But not simply one civilian. Because defense of others is 
permitted, all French civilians would be – by [my] argument – doing the right thing if 
they volunteered to serve in the German air-defense corps. And the German military too 
… would be justified in shooting down the planes in defense of others.” However, I 
neither say nor imply that the French civilians would “do the right thing” if they shot 
down Allied planes. My account does not even imply that they are permitted to do this. It 
has to be taken into account here, after all, that the Allied invasion benefits them. That, 
however, is not how the usual tactical bomber example is set up, where the threatened 
civilians belong to a neutral party. And finally, again, my account certainly does not 
imply that the French armed forces can join the Germans in defending their civilians 
against the Allied forces. 
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(which it shares with McMahan’s qualified account), it does not have the implausible 
implications McMahan ascribes to it.  
Moreover, at one point McMahan actually acknowledges that there is this possibility 
of sufficiently disconnecting liability from justification: “One might agree that the unjust 
combatants are not permitted to kill the bombers but also claim that this is not because 
the bombers are not liable to be killed.”46 He then presents an example that is somehow (I 
admit: I do not know how) supposed to undermine this strategy. He envisions a situation 
where the “unjust combatants” change their mind, so that the civilians who the justified 
bombers want to save from the allegedly unjust ones by engaging in the attack that will 
kill the (smaller number of) other innocent people (the villagers) “are no longer 
threatened by the unjust combatants.”47 He then asks us to consider whether the reformed, 
formerly unjust combatants, in order to do what is right, should attack the justified 
bombers to save the villagers or instead allow the bombers to kill the villagers and save 
the other civilians themselves. This thought experiment, however, is incoherent: if the 
civilians are no longer threatened (either because the formerly unjust combatants refrain 
from killing them or, if necessary, will protect them themselves against their non-
reformed former comrades), then the attack the allegedly justified bombers are about to 
engage in is not justified but in fact entirely unnecessary – and therefore there are good 
reasons to save the innocent villagers from the unjustified, liable bombers.48 
I conclude that McMahan’s first strategy of defending the “justification defeats 
liability to defensive attack doctrine,” namely by trying to reduce the negation of this 
doctrine to absurdity, is unsuccessful. 
 
4. What Really Matters: On Permissibly Resisting Justified Bombers and Impermissibly 
Resisting (Certain) Unjustified and Liable Thieves  
McMahan’s second strategy is to try to undermine arguments against the view that 
justification defeats liability (to defensive attack), which in turn is supposed to positively 
support his own view that justification does defeat liability to defensive attack. 
McMahan’s central example in the context of this strategy is the following:  
... a passerby finds a person in a diabetic coma. If the diabetic does not receive a 
shot of insulin within minutes, he will die. The passerby knows that the house 
immediately across the street from where the diabetic lies belongs to someone who 
has a bountiful supply of insulin. That person not being home, the passerby breaks 
in, takes some insulin, and saves the life of the diabetic.49 
While in the past McMahan made the more general claim that justification defeats 
                                                
46 McMahan, “Self-Defense Against Justified Threateners,” p. 116. 
47 Ibid. 
48 There are further problems with McMahan’s example and the use he tries to make of it, 
in particular his inclination of tarring all “unjust combatants” with the same brush: it is 
simply not true that all of them provoked the action of the allegedly justified combatants 
in the first place. See in this context Steinhoff, “Rights, Liability, and the Moral Equality 
of Combatants,” pp. 351-352, 361. The exception to agent-neutral liability mentioned 
above also becomes relevant again here, see ibid. pp. 357-358. 
49 McMahan, “Self-Defense Against Justified Threateners,” p. 119. 
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liability (not only liability to defensive attack) and asserted that this was also true in 
law,50 he now admits that tort law would require the passerby – although he has acted 
justifiably – to compensate the owner of the insulin. And he adds that many people think 
that this also reflects the demands of morality.51 
In “response to this challenge” McMahan argues 
that while justification does not exclude liability to compensate those one has 
harmed, it does exclude liability to defensive harm. One reason why this might be 
true is that to hold a justified threatener liable to compensate his victim is not to 
permit anyone to prevent his justified action, whereas to hold him liable to 
defensive action is to permit others to prevent the justified action.52 
Yet, this is simply wrong. To hold a justified actor liable to defensive force definitely 
does not amount to allowing interference with his justified act. McMahan should know 
this, since he himself provides an example of a case where it would be wrong to prevent 
even the unjustified action of a liable agent.53 (Consider this easier case: Karl is about to 
slap me out of spite. I know that if I defend myself against this attack, Karl’s father, the 
dictator, will kill 100 innocent people. Karl is liable to defensive measures by me – he 
cannot complain if I defend myself – but it seems that I ought not to defend myself all 
things considered. My defense against liable Karl would be impermissible given what is 
at stake.)  
In the same vein, it is not the passerby’s justification that rules out interference, but 
what is at stake, namely an innocent life. Consider a variation of McMahan’s insulin 
example. The passerby, out of spite and in order to harm the owner of the insulin, 
intentionally takes the much more expensive one of two insulin charges (it is so 
expensive because it helps not only against the common diabetes of the unconscious 
diabetic, but also against two incredibly rare kinds of diabetes), although the other one 
would be as effective. Since necessity justifications are subject to constraints of 
proportionality and, well, necessity, this act of taking the more expensive insulin would 
be unjustified. But suppose interfering with this act would not leave enough time to then 
provide the diabetic with the other charge. Is the owner of the insulin justified in stopping 
the unjustified, liable passerby? It does not seem so. But this means that liability and 
justification has not much to do with the reason why the passerby must not be stopped. 
Of course, McMahan affirms that “the killing of the bombers is not ruled out solely 
                                                
50 Jeff McMahan, “Debate: Justification and Liability in War,” The Journal of Political 
Philosophy 16(2) (2008), pp. 227–244, at 233-234. In Steinhoff, “Rights, Liability, and 
the Moral Equality of Combatants”, section 4.4., I argued that McMahan got the law 
wrong. 
51 McMahan, “Self-Defense Against Justified Threateners,” p. 118. 
52 Ibid., p. 119. 
53 Ibid., p. 107 (the police sniper example). Cases like these show that it is necessary to 
distinguish permissions from liberty-rights. For example, a person A might have a liberty 
right against person B to kill B without being permitted to kill B. In other words, just as 
claim rights can sometimes be justifiably violated for the greater good, liberties, for the 
sake of the greater good, must sometimes not be exercised. See Steinhoff, “Rights, 
Liability, and the Moral Equality of Combatants”, p. 347, n. 15. 
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because it would prevent the saving of the 100 civilians.”54 I agree, of course, but I agree 
because the killing of the bombers is not ruled out at all. In the modified insulin case, in 
contrast, stopping (let alone killing) is ruled out because it would prevent the saving of 
the diabetic, a saving which is possible without imposing excessive costs (like severe 
bodily injury or even death) on the owner of the insulin. Justification and non-liability 
have nothing to do with it: it is simply a question of weighing moral benefits and moral 
costs against each other. 
It is also interesting that McMahan sees the following difference between the case of 
the diabetic and the case of the tactical bombers: 
Whereas the owner would have a duty to provide the needed insulin were he at 
home, I have stipulated that the villagers (who are the cost-bearers in this case, as 
the owner is in the diabetic case) would not be required to act in a way that would 
sacrifice their own lives to save the 100 civilians.55 
Yet, sacrificing their lives is exactly what McMahan requires from the civilians. He 
does not require them to commit suicide, yes, but of course one can sacrifice one’s life 
without committing suicide. If, for instance, someone asked me not to shoot the tiger that 
is attacking me because if I did, the tiger could not go on to then also kill the villain who 
otherwise would kill 20 innocent people, then, yes indeed, it seems that what I am being 
asked is to sacrifice my life for the benefit of these other people.56 
Be that as it may, McMahan then considers a variation of the insulin case where the 
costs to the owner are so high that he is not under a duty to surrender the insulin. 
Surrendering it would be supererogatory. And McMahan claims: 
It also seems plausible to suppose that, even if the owner had no duty to provide the 
life-saving resource, the passerby’s justification in taking it would shield her from 
liability to harmful defensive action by the owner. The owner would, it seems, be 
permitted to thwart the passerby’s efforts by other means, but not by means that 
would involve the infliction of serious or substantial harm on the passerby.57 
Note the swift shift from merely “harmful defensive action” to “the infliction of 
serious or substantial harm.” It might well be plausible that the passerby is not liable to be 
killed or mutilated under these new circumstances, where the costs to the owner are 
significant. It is plausible because killing or mutilating him would be disproportionate. In 
contrast, that the passerby would not be liable to any form of harmful defensive measures 
(pushing, holding, or a punch to the solar plexus) although he would infringe the owner’s 
rights seems to be entirely implausible.  
This brings us to the actually decisive difference between the case of the bombers and 
the insulin case. This decisive difference is also an obvious one: the passerby is only 
taking some insulin; the bombers, however, are about to kill or mutilate the villagers. 
Given, therefore, that the costs imposed on the villagers and the costs imposed on the 
owner of the insulin differ not only quantitatively but qualitatively – there mere property 
                                                
54 McMahan, “Self-Defense Against Justified Threateners,” p. 114. 
55 Ibid. p. 122. 
56 See Uwe Steinhoff, “Why We Shouldn’t Reject Conflicts: A Critique of Tadros,” Res 
Publica 20(3) (2014), pp. 315-322. 
57 McMahan, “Self-Defense Against Justified Threateners,” p. 122. 
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rights are infringed, here, however, rights to bodily integrity and life58 – it is puzzling that 
McMahan takes the impermissibility (in the original case) of preventing the passerby 
from taking the insulin as justifying a statement like this:  
So even if the general claim that justification excludes all forms of liability is false, 
it may still be true that justification excludes liability to defensive harm, and that is 
all that is necessary to rule out the claim that the bombers are liable to defensive 
action either by the villagers or by third parties.59 
It “may” be true that justification excludes liability to defensive harm, but that cannot 
be established by the insulin example. That example might (or might not) show that 
sometimes justification defeats liability to defensive harm, but it does not show that it 
always does. In other words, while for an argument in support of the liability of the 
bombers it is quite sufficient to demonstrate that a justification to kill and maim innocent 
people does not exclude liability to defensive harm,60 it is certainly not sufficient for 
McMahan’s argument in support of the non-liability of the bombers to show that a non-
killing, non-maiming thief’s justification to steal insulin defeats liability to defensive 
harm. 
Not to ignore the qualitative differences is of the utmost importance. As far as a 
justified attacker’s liability to defensive harm is concerned, there seems to be no sliding 
scale, as it were, between minor harms and harms to life and bodily integrity. Rather, 
there seems to be a moral threshold which is based on the “separateness of persons,” to 
use Rawls’s term.61 German law, for example, holds that innocent people cannot 
reasonably be expected to sacrifice their own lives or bodily integrity for the survival of 
strangers, and therefore denies a necessity defense when it comes to killing or maiming 
innocent people.62 However, while I think that the first part is absolutely correct, the 
conclusion does not follow. If the stakes are high enough, killing innocent people can be 
                                                
58 Quite a number of philosophers and legal scholars deny that lethal defense of property 
is ever justifiable – even of very expensive property. See, for instance, David Rodin, War 
and Self-Defense (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 2002), pp 43-48; Boaz Sangero, Self-Defence 
in Criminal Law (Oxford and Portland, OR: Hart Publishing, 2006), pp 252-257; and 
especially Fiona Leverick, Killing in Self-Defence (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
2006), section 7, see there also for numerous further references. This would suggest a 
categorical difference between property on the one hand and life and limb on the other. 
But then there is no reason to assume that how we may react to an infringement of 
property rights can teach us much about how we may react to the infringement of our 
right to life and bodily integrity. 
59 McMahan, “Self-Defense Against Justified Threateners,” p. 119. 
60 I have provided a number of arguments for this precise claim, both on the legal and the 
moral level, in Steinhoff, “Rights, Liability, and the Moral Equality of Combatants”, 
section 4.4. 
61 John Rawls, A Theory of Justice (Cambridge: The Belknap Press of Harvard University 
Press, 1999), p. 167.  
62 Volker Erb, “Rechtfertigender Notstand,” in Wolfgang Joecks and Klaus Miebach 
(eds.), Münchener Kommentar zum Strafgesetzbuch, Vol. 1 (Munich: C. H. Beck, 2003), 
pp. 1346-1416, at 1350-1 and 1387. 
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justified, but given that they cannot reasonably be expected to sacrifice themselves for 
strangers, they cannot reasonably be expected not to fight back.63 This, incidentally, 
seems to be precisely the position taken by those US states that have adopted the Model 
Penal Code’s account of the necessity justification.64 It is, I submit, a quite reasonable 
position, which can certainly not be undermined by McMahan’s insulin example. 
 
5. Who “Should” Compensate? – and Why That Does Not Matter 
McMahan contemplates a second response to the challenge posed by the intuition that the 
passerby must compensate the owner of the insulin, namely to deny that this intuition is 
correct and to insist that the “stronger claim that moral justification excludes all forms of 
moral liability is true.”65 
Why, however, should that claim be true (it is most certainly not a very intuitive 
claim)? One of McMahan’s explanations is: 
The sacrifice of the insulin may simply have been what morality required of [the 
owner]. But given that he was not at home at the time the insulin was needed, the 
passerby acted in his absence to fulfill the duty he would have had if he had been at 
home. Thus no one is liable to compensate the owner for the loss of what he was 
morally required to sacrifice.66 
Yet, this “Thus” is a clear non-sequitur. Suppose I go into a bakery and say: “One 
cheesecake, please.” The baker answers: “Of course.” He has thereby entered into a 
contract with me and is now morally required to indeed give me the cheesecake. But that 
he has a Hohfeldian duty towards me to give me the cheesecake does not absolve me 
from my Hohfeldian duty towards him to pay him for it. Maybe, however, contractual 
duties are different.67 So let us look at a duty that is not contractual: the duty of gratitude 
or reciprocation. To wit, if a neighbor loans me flour when I ask him for it, then this 
seems to ground a duty on my part to lend him flour (all else being equal) if he asks for it. 
But that hardly implies that he can just walk into my apartment in my absence, take the 
flour, and be absolved of any duty of compensation.  
Likewise, that the owner has a duty to let the passerby take the insulin does not imply 
that the passerby has no duty to compensate the owner. (In others words, that the owner 
has to “sacrifice” the insulin does not mean that he also has to sacrifice its financial 
value.) As regards the claim that the owner would not have had a claim to compensation 
if he had provided the insulin himself – this is neither here nor there. The observation that 
justified rights infringements give rise to duties to compensate cannot be refuted by 
pointing to cases that do not involve rights infringements in the first place (the owner 
does not infringe his own rights by providing the insulin). 
McMahan makes a number of further claims that are, in my view, simply irrelevant for 
the issue in question. For example, he states that “the burden of the rescue should ideally 
                                                
63 Steinhoff, “Why We Shouldn’t Reject Conflicts.” 
64 Steinhoff, “Rights, Liability, and the Moral Equality of Combatants”, esp. 360-362. 
65 McMahan, “Self-Defense Against Justified Threateners,” p. 119. 
66 Ibid., p. 121. 
67 An anonymous reviewer raised this objection to my example. 
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be shared by everyone in the society (or indeed by everyone in the world).”68 But just as 
McMahan confused above an agent’s liability to interference with a second agent’s 
permission to interfere, he now confuses what people should do to some other people (for 
example, share the burdens with them) with what those other people are liable to. In that 
context he also considers another option (potentially more relevant to the non-ideal world 
since “there is no such [burden-sharing] scheme in place”69), namely to impose the costs 
of the rescue on its beneficiary: “The diabetic can … have no reasonable objection to 
being required to restore the owner to the position he would have been in had he not 
made (or been forced to make) the sacrifice, when the outcome of this would still be 
much better for the diabetic than what would have happened to him in the absence of the 
sacrifice.”70 Setting aside the question whether this is true or not, it is, again, irrelevant: 
that the diabetic cannot have a reasonable objection (which, incidentally, is not so clear) 
if he is required to compensate, does not imply that the passerby can have a reasonable 
objection if the owner first asks him to compensate. Indeed, it would appear that the 
passerby, whose act directly infringed the rights of the owner, owes the owner 
compensation; while the diabetic, whom the passerby directly benefited, perhaps owes 
compensation to the passerby. 
McMahan further considers what should happen if the beneficiary does not have the 
means to compensate and states: “Indeed, it seems implausible to me, regardless of what 
the law says, to suppose that third parties would be morally permitted to coerce the 
passerby to provide that compensation, given that she has acted with full moral 
justification.”71 Yet, provided the passerby has enough money, this seems entirely 
plausible to me, regardless of what McMahan says. Judith Jarvis Thomson notes: “[I]f A 
wants to do a certain good deed, and can pay what doing it would cost, then—other 
things being equal—A may do that good deed only if A pays the cost himself.”72 While I 
think that she is overstating her case here, it seems that the owner has not only a 
complaint against the passerby for infringing on his property rights in the first place, but 
also a further complaint if the passerby wants to impose the costs of his good deed on the 
owner.73 Besides, McMahan’s point is irrelevant again: even if it were true that third 
parties would not be morally permitted to coerce the passerby to provide compensation, 
this does not imply that the passerby is not under a duty towards the owner to provide 
compensation (after all, there is the famous “right to do wrong” – others are not 
                                                
68 McMahan, “Self-Defense Against Justified Threateners,” p. 120. Incidentally, I do not 
think that this would be “ideal” at all, but I set this issue aside here. 
69 Ibid. 
70 Ibid. 
71 Ibid., p. 121. 
72 Judith Jarvis Thomson, “Turning the Trolley,” Philosophy and Public Affairs 
36 (2008), pp. 359-74, at 365. 
73 McMahan suggests that the passerby has “already devoted her time to the rescue,” 
(ibid., p. 121), but that seems to be clearly outweighed by being able to have personally 
saved a life in an emergency situation (this might give one an emotional “boost” and 
significant recognition).  
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necessarily permitted to force one to do what one has an obligation or a duty to do74). 
In that context, let me come back to the proviso: what if the passerby does not have 
enough money, what if he is really poor, and taking his money for the insulin would 
impose an unreasonable hardship on him? In that case, I submit, perhaps neither the state 
nor the owner should insist that the passerby compensate the owner. But, again, this does 
not mean that he has no duty to compensate, that he is not liable to pay compensation. 
Out of beneficence or compassion the owner should not insist on his right (German law 
calls inappropriate insistence on one’s rights abuse of rights, but for there to be an abuse 
of a right, there obviously has to be that right in the first place), but, conversely, the 
passerby should at least apologize to the owner: “Look, I am really sorry, but I can’t pay 
for the damages I unjustly inflicted on you.” This confirms that he is not released of his 
duty towards the owner (unless the owner releases him himself), even if, all things 
considered, one should not make him pay out of compassion and mercy. 
Thus, McMahan’s discussion of compensation in no way warrants his conclusion that 
“the justified agent is not liable to compensate the victim,” let alone his further 
conclusion that “[t]his, in turn, supports the more general claim that justification excludes 
liability.”75 Nor does it warrant his claim that “the case of the insulin shows that the 
intuitions about compensation to which Steinhoff appeals are not so robust as he 
supposes.”76 First, while showing that justification does not defeat liability to pay 
compensation shows that justification does not always defeat liability, conversely, 
showing that justification defeats liability to pay compensation would still not show that 
it does always defeat liability – including a justified killer’s or mutilator’s liability to 
defensive attack by his innocent victims. Second, McMahan’s discussion shows nothing 
about the robustness of our intuitions, not least since his discussion of how we should 
distribute burdens or what we are or are not permitted to do misses the mark – it has little 
to do with the question of who is liable to what. 
 
Conclusion 
McMahan argues that justification defeats liability to defensive attack. In response, I 
argued, first, that McMahan’s attempt to burden the contrary claim with counter-intuitive 
implications fails; second, that McMahan’s own position implies that the innocent 
civilians do not have a right of self-defense against justified attackers, which neither 
coheres with his description of the case (the justified bombers infringe the rights of the 
civilians) nor with his views about rights forfeiture, is unsupported by independent 
argument, and, in any case, is extremely implausible and counter-intuitive; and third, that 
his interpretation of the insulin case confuses the normative relations between an agent’s 
justification and non-liability (or lack thereof) on the one hand and permissible or 
impermissible interference with the agent’s act on the other. Similar confusions, fourth, 
affect his discussion of liability to compensation. I conclude that McMahan has failed to 
demonstrate that justification defeats liability to defensive attack.77 
                                                
74 Jeremy Waldron, “A Right to Do Wrong,” Ethics 92(1) (1981), pp. 21-39. 
75 McMahan, “Self-Defense Against Justified Threateners,” p. 122. 
76 Ibid., p. 123. 
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